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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose in early 2001 you had purchased $1000.00 worth of Enron stock.
If you had sold that stock one year later you would be left with less than
$10.00.1 Suppose instead that in early 2001 you placed that $1000.00 into
WorldCom and then sold your holdings one year later. In WorldCom, your
$1000.00 would now be worth less than $25.00.2 Finally, suppose you had
prudently purchased $1000.00 worth of Budweiser (the beer, not the stock) in
mid 2001. You then happily spent the next twelve months consuming that beer
and crushing each can as you swallowed the last drop. At the end of those
twelve months, if you turned in your cans for the ten-cent deposit you would
have been left with roughly $I00.00.' Clearly then, the best investment advice
in this age of corporate shenanigans and declining markets is to drink heavily
and recycle.
Of course, it is only wishful thinking to hope that business and investing
were so simple. Corporate executives do deceive, and in the cases of Enron,
WorldCom and others, that deceit helps force the companies into eventual
bankruptcy.4 When bankruptcies do occur, individual shareholder claims often
become essentially worthless.5 Creditors, however, are afforded greater protec-
tions with regards to recovering their investment.
6
* J.D. 2005, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would
like to thank Professor Robert Lawless for providing so many ideas and offering patient
support as this note began to take shape. I am also greatly indebted to Judge Bruce A.
Markell and Professor Katherine Porter for guiding me through the maze of bankruptcy.
Big Charts, at http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/intchart/frames/frames.asp?symb=EA:71
783 19&sid= 779327&time= (last visited Mar. 17, 2004) (on file with NEVADA LAW
JOURNAL).
2 See id.
3 This calculation assumes a can of beer sells for $1.00 per can, which might only happen in
a perfect world.
4 See Shawn Young, Leading News: MCI Slashes $3 Billion From '05 Revenue Estimate,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 8, 2003).
I See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost,
1999 Sup. CT. REV. 393, 406 (1999) [hereinafter "Boyd's Ghost"].
6 Id.
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Perhaps most important of the protections that unsecured creditors enjoy is
the "best interests of creditors" test.7 The test safeguards those individual cred-
itors who dissent from a proposed chapter 11 reorganization plan.8 To comply
with the best interests test, a proposed plan must give individualcreditors in
chapter 11 at least what they would have recovered if the corporation had been
liquidated under chapter 79
The best interests test has been a part of statutory bankruptcy law for over
100 years.' 0 The test seeks to balance the need to approve nonconsensual reor-
ganization plans against the need to protect dissenting creditor's claims." The
balance is struck by ensuring creditors will receive at least what they would
under a chapter 7 liquidation.12 Creditors cannot be forced to receive less in a
chapter 11 reorganization than they would in a chapter 7 liquidation. 3
The effectiveness of the best interests test as a mechanism to protect credi-
tors depends in large part upon the accuracy of a debtor's disclosure statement,
which estimates creditor recovery in a hypothetical liquidation.14 However, the
preparation of a disclosure statement with estimated liquidation proceeds is a
subjective business." A debtor usually prepares an analysis which estimates a
liquidation recovery based upon a sort of "fire-sale" conditions resulting in
severely depressed liquidation proceeds.
16
This note begins by tracing the historical origins and evolution of the best
interests of creditors test from early American bankruptcy law to the present.
The analysis section then asks whether, in light of that history, the application
of the test in the WorldCom bankruptcy is in keeping with its purpose. The
note concludes with a discussion of whether the bankruptcy approach currently
followed by the United Kingdom, the United States' common law parent,
would not better protect dissenting creditor interests.
II. HISTORY OF THE "BEST INTERESTS OF CREDITORS" TEST
When Congress enacted Section 1129(a)(7) in 1978, it did not simply pull
the words "best interests" out of thin air. Rather, the context of Congress'
action in drafting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was an attempt to incor-
porate a concept from previous bankruptcy statutes that had themselves been
attempts to codify existing bankruptcy laws and procedures. 17 When Congress
chose the term "best interests" as the test for the confirmation of reorganization
plans, despite dissenting individual creditors under 1129(a)(7), it was legislat-
7 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2002).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1934).
'1 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 10-18 (1992).
15 Id.
16 id.
17 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Bruce A. Markell at 7, Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (No. 97-1418) [hereinafter "LaSalle
Brief'].
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ing in the context of nearly 100 years of statutory history and reorganization
practice. 18
A. The History of Two Different Reorganization Approaches
Before the 1934 changes to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, a company essen-
tially had three restructuring options instead of liquidation. A debtor could
enter into a voluntary contract between it and its debtors' 9 or make use of the
existing bankruptcy laws under the 1898 Act and enter into a composition
agreement with creditors.2 ° A bankrupt corporation could also turn to the
equity powers of the court and the equity receivership. 2 The modern best
interests test can only be understood as the contemporary product of the com-
position and the equity receivership options.22
1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The concept of a composition was codified in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
which, in turn, was derived in part from the 1874 federal bankruptcy legisla-
tion23 which had its roots in both English and Scottish common law.24 Under
the 1898 statutory approach, the form and extent of debt relief was determined
by a vote according to a statutorily determined percentage of creditors.25 The
equity receivership option proceeded along an entirely different path that
veered away from the concept of democratic voting amongst the creditors
themselves.26 Under this approach, the specific form or type of debt relief was
determined by a court or administrative agency that was designated to oversee
the reorganization process.27 The development of both historical bankruptcy
alternatives illustrates the modern best interests test.
The first bankruptcy alternative has its roots in the common law regarding
the composition of creditors.2 8 At common law, a debtor in financial difficulty
would enter into a master agreement with most or all of its creditors for debt
relief.29 These compositions, as the agreements came to be called, could mod-
ify maturity dates, interest rates, and other terms of the debt as needed by the
debtor.3°
In 1874, federal legislation attempted to foster compositions by providing
a statutory mechanism for the first time by which a composition with less than
18 Id.
19 Bruce A. Markell, Claims & Opinions: Clueless On Classification: Toward Removing
Artificial Limits On Chapter II Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 6 (1994).
20 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 12 (repealed 1934).
21 Paul B. Lewis, Trouble from Down Under: Some Thoughts on the Australian-American
Corporate Bankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 189, 205-06 (2001).
22 See generally Markell, supra note 19.
23 Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 1-78 (repealed 1878).
24 Markell, supra note 19, at 6-7.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 8.
29 Id. at 6-7.
30 Id. at 6-7.
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unanimous creditor approval could be approved.3" The 1874 Act had its roots
in both English32 and Scottish law3 3 and held that if certain procedural require-
ments were met, the plan would be binding upon all creditors, even those who
were not in agreement with the composition.34
In 1898, with the enactment of a comprehensive Bankruptcy Reform Act,
Congress gave statutory legitimacy to a concept already well founded in both
American and Western European law.35 The 1898 Act incorporated composi-
tions as a fundamental part of the bankruptcy code for the first time.3 6 The
1898 Act repealed the 1874 Act and introduced two new requirements before
the court could confirm a composition.37 Under the new code, for a composi-
tion to be confirmed despite dissenting creditors it had to be in the "best inter-
ests of creditors" and be proposed in "good faith."
38
Unfortunately, Section 12(d), the confirmation section of the 1898 statute,
did not explicitly define what sorts or versions of compositions would be in a
creditor's best interest.3 9 However, a composition agreement was understood
to satisfy Section 12 if the plan gave creditors a consideration approximately
equal to the value they would receive in a straight bankruptcy liquidation
sale.4° Thus, so long as the unsecured creditors received at the very least what
they would receive if the bankrupt's assets were liquidated, the test would be
satisfied. Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, a composition plan could win
approval over the objections of a minority of unsecured creditors so long as the
plan: (1) had the assent of the majority and amount of creditors; (2) was pro-
posed in "good faith;" and (3) was in the "best interests of creditors."'"
The 1898 Act only tells part of the story largely due to the fact that the
provisions in the act for confirming non-unanimous plans act could only affect
31 Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178 (repealed 1878) (amending § 43 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867).
32 Bankruptcy Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 126 (Eng.). Section 126 provided for a
court-approved composition instead of bankruptcy. The alternative was attractive because
the approval of all the creditors was not a prerequisite to approval. Rather, a composition
could be approved by a majority in number, and 75% in value, of creditors at a properly
convened meeting would bind dissenting creditors. Id.
33 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act of 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 79 (1856) (Eng.). Under the
Scottish Act, a majority of creditors who held at a minimum 80% in value could stay the
bankruptcy proceedings to work out an arrangement. Id. at § 35. If at any time during the
two months the creditors were allotted to work out the arrangement, 80% of the creditors
holding 80% of the claims were to agree on a plan, they could force the acceptance of the
composition despite dissenting minority creditors. Id. at § 38.
34 Id.
35 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1934).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. The 1898 Act provided that a judge shall confirm a plan if: "(1) it was for the best
interest of the creditors; (2) the bankrupt has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to
perform any of the duties which would be a bar to his discharge; and (3) the offer and its
acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or procured except as herein provided,
or by any means, promises, or acts herein forbidden."
39 Id.
0 Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1354 (1939).
'1 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1934).
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unsecured debt.42 Section 12 was simply inadequate for the large company
reorganizations of the time that could only be achieved by affecting the rights
of not only unsecured debt, but secured creditors and equity holders as well.43
For the flexibility required for larger corporate bankruptcies, to reach bargains
affecting all interested classes, secured and unsecured creditors as well as
stockholders, corporations turned to the equity receivership."
2. Equity Receiverships
The history of corporate reorganizations and the equity receivership is
largely the history of railroad reorganizations.45 The interim between the Civil
War and the beginning of the 20th century was a period of explosive growth for
railroads.46 But due to government regulation, overlaying of track and fierce
competition, by 1915 over one-half of railroad debt securities had been in
default at one time or another.4 7 To keep this vital part of the American econ-
omy running when threatened with insolvency, the railroad concerns of the day
turned to the courts of equity and their powers to appoint a receiver to oversee
reorganization proceedings." This practice continued until the enactment of
§ 77B in 1934.49
During the latter part of the 19th century, the debt of:
a paradigmatic railroad in need of reorganization took the following form. There
were few general creditors. There were different classes of bonds, each widely held
by diverse investors, many of whom were in Europe. One bond was secured by track
between point A and point B, another secured by track between point B and C, a third
between C and D, and so on. Points B and Y are in the middle of nowhere, and the
terminals at points A and Z connect to solvent railroads owned by the shareholders.
50
Due to the fractured state of railroad debt, if the value of all of the compo-
nent parts were to be maximized, all of the creditors would have to actively
participate.51 While Congress had the power to enact a federal bankruptcy law
and had done so in 1898, it had yet to enact a corporate reorganization statute.5 2
To foster the requisite cooperation amongst the parties, the corporations of the
time turned to the equity powers of the court.53 Federal courts of equity had
the power to appoint a receiver who could oversee the reorganization process.54
42 Id.
43 Markell, supra note 19, at 8. For a generalized overview of the limitations of composi-
tions with regard to large corporate bankruptcies, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 7.41, at
1334-35 (14th ed. 1978).
4 Boyd's Ghost, supra note 5, at 403.
45 See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991).
46 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUiPrcY 764 (1997).
41 See, e.g., Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153, 154 (1917).
48 Boyd's Ghost, supra note 5, at 403.
49 See Garrard Glenn, The Basis of the Federal Receivership, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 434
(1925).
50 Boyd's Ghost, supra note 5, at 403.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 403-04.
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To facilitate the pressing problem of the indebted railroads, and with little
applicable statutory guidance, the lawyers turned to the equity receivership to
bring about the desired reorganization.55
Receiverships normally began with a creditor's petition to the federal
court to exercise its equity jurisdiction and appoint a receiver to assume control
of the corporation's assets.56 The process was usually initiated by the insiders
who ran the railroad, and were typically also its principal stockholders.57 The
insiders would convince a friendly creditor to "petition the equity court to place
the railroad's assets in the hands of a receiver. 58 The court appointed receiver
was often the individual then already managing the railroad.5 9 Once the
receiver was appointed, the reorganization action began in earnest.
The receivership provided an umbrella under which the holders of differ-
ing claims could reorganize themselves before the culmination of the entire
process in a judicially supervised sale of the company. 6 Initially, committees
were formed to represent the claims of differing classes.6" Individuals within
that class were then pressured to deposit their respective claims with their com-
mittee.62 Eventually, selected individuals from these class-committees would
combine to form a reorganization committee that would then decide on a value
for each class's claims.6 3
Finally, the reorganization committee would attend the sale of the rail-
road.' "The market was sufficiently illiquid" that the reorganization commit-
tee usually was able to purchase the railroad for only a fraction of what it was
truly worth when measured as a going-concern. 65 The real advantage that the
equity receivership umbrella provided is apparent in light of the consequences
to those creditors who had dissented and refused to cast their lots with those in
their respective class. Those who had assented to the plan would receive what
they were allotted under the reorganization plan, but those who did not would
only receive the value of their share based on what had been recovered at the
judicial sale.66 The value of those shares after the judicial sale was usually
nothing or only a fraction of the original claim.6 7
Despite the obvious disadvantage to dissenting creditors, the equity receiv-
ership provided an indispensable mechanism by which investors could organize
themselves and take definitive action to save the company.68 Central to the
success of the entire process was the final judicial sale where the committee
was able to purchase the corporation for less than the going-concern value of
55 Id. at 403.
56 Id. at 404.
57 id.
58 id.
59 Id. at 404.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Id.
64 id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 id.
68 Id.
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the company.69 The system had the effect of leaving equity holders in place,
even though some creditors were not paid in full.7" This worked because the
judicial sale minted a new owner (usually the previous stockholders) who took
the assets free of all preexisting claims.7 1 The situation that emerged was one
in which the shareholders could invoke the bankruptcy process, partially shut
out the interests of creditors who refused to fall into conformity with the com-
mittee, and still remain in control of the corporation.72 Of course, this arrange-
ment rested on the stockholders providing the necessary capital for the
reorganization in the form of the buyout at the judicial sale.7 3
This sort of arrangement differs significantly from contemporary reorgani-
zation practice. Modem debt contracts are thought to include the right to wipe
out the shareholders in the event a firm becomes insolvent.74 In situations
where the firm's liabilities exceed its assets the shareholders should be elimi-
nated.75 However, because of the very fact that some creditors were not being
paid in full while equity was able to continue running, the corporation was the
one of the primary reasons the equity receivership eventually met its demise.
As was perhaps inevitable with a system with very little oversight, inside
deals eventually became common in receiverships and abuses became com-
monplace.7 6 The system often operated to pay massive fees to professionals,
many of who were cohorts of the debtor's managers.77 Reorganization plans
were consistently approved which favored junior interests represented by man-
agement at the expense of senior creditors who were not so lucky.78 The situa-
tion was ripe for a change, but though the Supreme Court had taken steps to
limit the corrupt receivership regime, it wasn't until the Depression that Con-
gress finally responded.79
B. 1930s Statutory Modifications and Chapter X and XI
In response to the rampant abuses in equity receivership practice, several
judicial doctrines appeared, most important of which was the "absolute priority
rule."80 In very general terms, the absolute priority rule recognizes nonban-
kruptcy priorities in corporate reorganizations. 81 The rule presents the general
principle that "creditors, in the order of their nonbankruptcy priorities, are to be
satisfied in full from the debtor's assets before the debtor may retain any inter-
est in those assets."82 This rule became part of reorganization practice through
69 Id.
70 Id. at 405.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 406.
75 Id.
76 See generally Jacob Trieber, The Abuses of Receiverships, 19 YALE L.J. 275 (1910).
77 Id.
78 Rostow & Cutler, supra note 40, at 1345.
79 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 9.
8 See generally Boyd's Ghost, supra note 5.
j. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditors or
Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REV. 540, 541 (1973).
82 Id.
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the United States Supreme Court case Northern Pacific Railway Co. v Boyd, 3
and has been further developed through subsequent Supreme Court cases.84
Boyd dealt with the principles governing the fairness of distributions
between both creditors and shareholders in equity receiverships. 8 5 The Boyd
court applied to equity reorganizations the reasoning of the court in Louisville
Trust Co. v. Louisville Railway: "[A~ny arrangement of the parties by which the
subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured
at the expense of the prior rights of [a] class of creditors comes within judicial
denunciation."86 If a plan satisfied this "fixed principle" from the Boyd case, it
had to be "fair and equitable."87
1. Sections 77 and 77B
In 1933, Congress enacted Section 77 which amended the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act and permitted railroads to be bankrupts.88 In addition to permitting
railroads to qualify as bankrupts for the first time, Section 77 also codified the
existing receivership practices.8 9 One equity receivership practice that was
retained was the drafting and approval of plans of reorganization which stated
the revised capital structure of the reorganized entity, and which also provided
for distributions to creditors.9" To confirm such a proposal under equity
receivership principles, a plan had to be "fair and equitable," a requirement that
Section 77 retained. 9 1
Section 77 was an amendment to the already existing 1898 bankruptcy
code that had been based on the principle of compositions in reorganization
practice. 92 While section 77 extended to "railroads engaged in interstate com-
merce" the statutory right to reorganization proceedings, it did not extend that
right to all corporations generally.9 3 More importantly, insofar as the amend-
ment maintained the separation between compositions for the benefit of bank-
rupt individuals and reorganizations for the benefit of insolvent railroads,
Section 12(d) of the 1898 Act was unaffected.9 4 Thus, under the Act as it stood
in 1933, compositions for the benefit of individuals must be "for the best inter-
ests of all creditors ' 9 5 while railroad reorganizations could not be "unfair" with
respect to all classes of creditors or stockholders.96
83 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
84 Marine Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Consol. Rock Prods.
Co. v. du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939).
85 Boyd, 228 U.S. 482.
86 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899).
87 Trost, supra note 81, at 542.
88 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (repealed 1938).
89 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 9.
90 Boyd's Ghost, supra note 5, at 403-06.
91 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 9.
92 Id.
93 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (repealed 1938).
94 Id. While § 77 extended railroads the right to be bankrupt, Congress had still not
extended reorganization relief to corporations generally.
95 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 74(g), 47 Stat. 1467 (repealed 1938).
96 See id. at § 77.
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The best interests test is conspicuously absent from the first real American
corporate reorganization statute.97 In 1934, Congress again amended the 1898
Act, this time extending bankruptcy relief to corporations generally.98 In pass-
ing the Section 77B amendment Congress broadened the term "unfair" to read
"fair and equitable," which defined the phrase more clearly as incorporating the
priority rule from equity receivership practice.99 The best interests of creditors
test is found nowhere in Section 77B."°° Of course, Section 77B applied spe-
cifically to corporate reorganizations,10 1 and from the 1898 Act until the 1934
amendment, the best interests test had been applied to compositions, which
usually were not used for large corporate reorganizations. °2 Not until the next
comprehensive revision of the bankruptcy code was the best interests test
applied to corporations generally.
2. The Chandler Act of 1938 and Chapters X and XI
In 1938, Congress radically overhauled the corporate reorganization
laws.' 3 Section 77B was split into three chapters each of which addressed
specific corporate reorganization situations." The first, Chapter X, was
intended to facilitate the reorganizations of large public companies and was
enacted against a backdrop of perceived abuse of public creditors and investors
under then-current reorganization laws." 5 Chapter X incorporated Section
7713's confirmation requirement that a reorganization plan be "fair and
equitable."10 6
By including the phrase in Chapter X, Congress retained the priority pro-
visions with regard to creditor classes that had descended from the Supreme
Court's decision in Boyd.10 7 However, not until 1939, one year after Chapter
X was adopted, did Justice William 0. Douglas offer some clarity on the
intended rigidity of those class priorities.10 8 Under Justice Douglas' interpreta-
tion, "fair and equitable" meant absolute priority.o9 That meant that beginning
97 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938). See also Rostow &
Cutler, supra note 40, at 1353 ("the phrase 'best interest of creditors' as applied to composi-
tion as it has been suggested, some of the qualities of a term of art; there may be correspond-
ing significance in the fact of its omission from [Section 77B and Chapter X] the two real
corporate reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Act").
98 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938).
9 Id. See also LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 9 (Congress first used the complete phrase
"fair and equitable" in 1934 when it used Section 77 as a template and extended bankruptcy
protection to municipalities. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, §80(e), 48 Stat. 798 (repealed
1938)).
100 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938).
101 Id.
102 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 12 (repealed 1934).
103 The Chandler Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
104 U.S. BANKR.COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKR. Laws Of The U.S.,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter "COMMISSION REPORT"].
105 Id.
106 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 13.
107 Id. at 12-13.
108 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). Justice William 0. Doug-
las concluded that the phrase "fair and equitable" carried forward the practices and prece-
dents of equity receiverships and to that extent the phrase meant the absolute priority rule.
109 Trost, supra note 81, at 542.
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with the topmost class of claims, each lower class must be paid in full before
lower classes could participate."l
Chapter XI was a different reorganization chapter intended to serve a dif-
ferent need within the universe of reorganization practice.' The chapter as it
was originally envisioned was to facilitate the reorganization of smaller,
closely-held corporations.' 1 2 The application of Chapter XI was also restricted
to only unsecured debt113 and it did not require debtors to satisfy an absolute
priority rule.114
Chapter XI required that confirmation of a reorganization plan must be
"for the best interests of the creditors." '  The phrase was intended "to accom-
modate the retention of any equity interest even though the creditors were
scaled down" '116 and was to incorporate flexibility: the standards of a fair plan
established in Boyd.117 Plans were "fair" under Chapter XI if creditors
received more under the reorganization plan than they would have received in
liquidation. 18
While the drafters of the Chandler Act of 1938 had intended that Chapter
X, not Chapter XI, would handle the bulk of large corporate reorganizations,
the reality of bankruptcy practice was something completely different. 9
Chapter X was never widely used as corporations sought, instead chose, to
reorganize under Chapter XI.120 Corporations preferred Chapter XI for several
reasons. In Chapter XI, the debtor initiated the proceedings and held the exclu-
sive right to propose a plan. 121 The debtor usually continued to operate the
business, which in turn usually meant that the debtor's attorney was ensured
continual employment. 122 Proponents of Chapter XI argued that the ability to
avoid the interference of a third party, such as a trustee, allowed for greater
reorganization speed and economy.12 3 While the inability to effect secured
creditors or equity security interests in Chapter XI made the chapter appear, at
least superficially, impractical for most large corporate reorganizations, by the
1970s bankruptcy lawyers had been able to overcome those limitations.t 24
110 Id. at 541
I" LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 13.
112 Id. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, pt. 1, at 245. Those involved in
drafting the 1938 Chandler Act had intended that Chapter XI would be for "small, closely
held corporation[s]" although Chapter 11 itself was silent as to its intention.
113 Id. at 240.
114 Id. Chapter XI appeared to also require adherence to the absolute priority rule because
the Chapter also required that plans be "fair and equitable." However, in 1952 Congress
amended the act to remove the "fair and equitable" requirement from Chapter XI. See Act
of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433.
"I Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 911.
116 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, pt 1, at 245.
117 Id.
118 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §10-18 (1992).
119 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104, pt 1, at 246.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 247.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. While Chapter XI had the limitation that plans could not affect secured creditors or
equity interests, case law had evolved to such a point that secured creditors were effectively
precluded from realizing on their collateral as long as the bankruptcy proceedings continued.
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Chapter X differed dramatically in that once a reorganization process was
initiated, a disinterested trustee was appointed and the role of the debtor and its
counsel were greatly reduced. 125 In its recommendation to Congress before the
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws found that corporate debtors did not choose Chapter XI because of
its advantages of speed and economy as its proponents asserted.1 26 Rather,
corporations chose Chapter XI because it allowed for greater debtor control as
well as a standard of fairness determined by the "best interests" test in lieu of
the absolute priority rule. 127
C. The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act
By 1978, Congress concluded that any justification for the distinct chap-
ters had disappeared. 128 Chapter X had been intended to provide public protec-
tion to investors that had been lacking under equity receivership practices. 129
Under the realities of reorganization bankruptcy practice, as it stood in the
1970s, investors once again were exposed to the avarice of the debtor. 130
In response to the inadequacies of Chapters X and XI, Congress combined
them into a single, comprehensive reorganization chapter in the 1978 Act.13 1
The goal in creating the new single chapter was to "adopt in part the flexibility
of chapter XI and incorporate the fundamental public protection features of
current chapter X.' 132 The new code greatly reduced the role of the SEC 13 3
and allowed debtors to remain in control of the business during the
reorganization.' 34
The 1978 Act also drastically altered the absolute priority rule. 1 35 Under
the new law, only a class of creditors could challenge a plan on the grounds
that it was not "fair and equitable."1 36 While in Chapter X, no individual dis-
senting creditor, however, could challenge the plan on the grounds it did not
comply with the absolute priority rule. 137
In place of the absolute priority rule, individual creditors received the best
interests test, now codified in Section 1129(a)(7). '38 Thus, once a creditor was
granted value equal to the value it would have received under liquidation in
chapter 7, the surplus going-concern value of the corporation would be allo-
cated by democratic vote within classes of creditors. 139 In this way, the new
code embraced two distinct statutory tests for dealing with dissenting creditors.
125 Id.
126 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104 pt 1, at 247.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See generally Markell, supra note 19, at 9-13.
130 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104 pt 1, at 242.
131 Id. at 237.
132 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 764 (1997).
133 Id.
134 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104 pt 1, at 237.
135 Id.
136 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 16-17.
137 Id.
138 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
139 Trost, supra note 81, at 550-51.
[Vol. 5:820
FOXES GUARDING THE HENHOUSE
Nonconsensual plans could be confirmed over dissenting classes so long as the
absolute priority rule was satisfied, and individual dissenters were bound so
long as the plan was in their "best interest." 140
D. The Best Interests Test in Chapter 11
The modem best interests test codified in Section 1129(a)(7) 41 is an
"individual guaranty to each creditor or interest holder that it will receive at
least as much in reorganization as it would in liquidation."142 Operationally,
this guaranty indicates that any value exceeding the liquidation value of the
corporation is subject to group vote rather than individual demand. 143 Thus,
section 1129(a)(7) requires that each individual member of a class either accept
the reorganization plan, or receive (i) property (ii) that has a present value equal
to (iii) that participant's hypothetical chapter 7 distribution (iv) if the debtor
were liquidated instead of reorganized on the plan's effective date."'
None of these components of the liquidation analysis are closed to
debate. 145 However, the calculation of the hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution
is of particular interest. 146 To the extent that the corporation's present value
has already been calculated, it must equal or exceed "the amount that [the]
holder would ... receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter
7" of the Code. 14 7 Practically, to comply with the best interests test, every
debtor proposing a bankruptcy plan must perform a liquidation analysis and
present it to the creditors. 148 That analysis proceeds under the assumption that
Chapter 7 is controlling which modifies some nonbankruptcy liquidation
rules.149
Liquidation distributions in Chapter 7 are governed by section 726 of the
Code which is largely consistent with nonbankruptcy practice.15° However,
section 726 makes exception for "tardily filed claims, for fines, penalties and
punitive damages and for postpetition interest."'' Section 726(a)(4) subordi-
nates the payment of certain penalty claims and mandates that "a claim ... for
any fine, penalty or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary or punitive damages
... to the extent that such [amount is] not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss" be subordinated to non-penalty unsecured claims. 5 '
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (codifying the best interests of creditors test); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) (codifying the concept of the absolute priority rule).
141 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
142 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY 1129.03[7] (15th rev. ed.) (1996) [hereinafter COLLIER].
143 Id. at 1129.0317].
144 See id. at I 1129.03[7][b].
145 See id. at 1129.03[7][b][iii].
146 Id.
147 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
148 COLLIER, supra note 142, at 1129.03[7][b][iii] n.87. The liquidation analysis does not
have to take the form of a separate document labeled as such. However, the analysis does
have to be presented to the creditors in some form such that they can understand it. Other-
wise, the best interests requirement is not satisfied. Tranel v. Adams Bank Trust Co. (In re
Tranel), 940 F.2d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1991).
149 COLLIER, supra note 142, at 1129.03[7][b][iii].
150 Id. at I 1129.03[7][c].
151 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3)-(5).
152 Id. at § 726(a)(4).
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In connecting the liquidation analysis to Chapter 7, Congress indicated
that "in order to determine the hypothetical distribution in a liquidation, the
court will have to consider the various subordination provisions of proposed 11
U.S.C. 510, 726(a)(3), 726(a)(4), and the postponement provisions of proposedI1I U.S.C. 724."' 153
III. ANALYsIs
In most bankruptcy cases the liquidation analysis will form part of the
disclosure statement that will be given to claim and interest holders.15 4 In fact,
a debtor must perform a liquidation analysis to fully comply with section
1129(a)(7). 155 In preparing a proper liquidation analysis, a debtor must set out:
the "value of the debtor's assets, the secured claims against those assets, pro-
jected Chapter 11 and 7 administrative expenses, priority claims and unsecured
claims, and a calculation of the percent distribution to each type of claim." '156
Of course, to the extent the debtor itself is charged with proposing the plan and
preparing the liquidation analysis, the results are very subjective. 1 7
WorldCom's liquidation analysis illustrates this subjectivity and impli-
cates other issues. First, what might be the implications of the recently enacted
Sarbanes-Oxley Act1"8 with respect to WorldCom's liquidation analysis? Sec-
ond, is the WorldCom liquidation analysis, to the extent that it is a fire-sale
approach to estimated liquidation proceeds, the desired method of devising a
plan that is in the "best interests" of creditors?
A. WorldCom Disclosure Statement
On July 9, 2003, WorldCom filed a "Supplement to Debtors' Disclosure
Statement" that included the requisite liquidation analysis.1 59 The table below
presents the estimated liquidation proceeds of a WorldCom liquidation in a
hypothetical Chapter 7.1' Under WorldCom's analysis, in liquidation its
secured creditors would recover 100% of their investments, priority
claimholders would recover 92.4%, and WorldCom's unsecured creditors
would recover nothing.1 6 1
153 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 412-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368.
154 COLLIER, supra note 142, at I 1129.03[7][b][iii].
155 Id. at I 1129.03[7][b][iii]. The best interests test of section 1129(a)(7) cannot be satisfied
without a liquidation analysis. In re Modem Steel Treating Co., 25 C.B.C.2d 292, 130 B.R.
60 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
156 EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at §§ 10-18.
157 Id.
158 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85.
159 Supplement to Debtor's Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1401 (Bankr.
S. D. N.Y. 2003), at http://www .elawforworldcom .com / worldcomdisclosure Frame. htm
[hereinafter "WorldCom Disclosure Statement"].
'60 Id. at F-3.
161 Id.
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Projected Book Estimated
Value as of Recovery
9/30/03 Recovery Proceeds
($ in millions) Percent ($ in millions)
Proceeds from Liquidation
Cash and cash equivalents 4,524 100.0% 4,524
Accounts receivable, net 3,794 24.6% 935
Other current assets 584 3.9% 23
Property, plant and equipment, net 5,585 16.4% 918
Other long term assets 1,580 9.1% 143
Proceeds from non-debtor subsidiaries - - 25
Gross liquidation proceeds $16,067 $6,568
Chapter 7 Administrative Expense Claims
Trustee and receiver fees 61
Counsel for trustee and other professional fees 24
Wind-down costs 1,230
Chapter 7 administrative expense claims 1,315
Net proceeds available for distribution 5,253
Secured claims 142
% Recovery 100.0%
Net proceeds available after secured claims 5,111
Less:
Estimated aggregate unpaid administrative expense, priority, and tax claims 5,529
% Recovery 92.4%
Net proceeds available after priority claims 0
General unsecured claims 39,762
% Recovery 0.0%
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Implications
The year 2002 may well be remembered by the business community as
one in which the bear market revealed the fraudulent shenanigans of a frighten-
ing fraction of Wall Street.' 6 2 In late 2001, in what was to only be the tip of
the iceberg of corporate scandal, Enron revealed that it had fraudulently mis-
stated financial statements. 16 3 The resulting scandal ultimately forced Enron to
file for Chapter 11 protection in December 2001.164 The Enron bankruptcy
was only a prelude to further scandals involving one of the big five accounting
firms,' 6 5 fraudulent analyst stock recommendations,' 66 and Adelphia Commu-
nications' enormous undisclosed loans benefiting founder Rigas and family.' 67
Then in June 2002, WorldCom sharply cut its sales forecast, after denying
it had any accounting issues.168 Shortly thereafter, Bernie Ebbers resigned as
its CEO. 169 Later, in what would develop into the largest corporate scandal in
162 See Jarrod Wilcox, 2002's Top Investment Story - Fraud Revealed, WILCOX INV., INC.
ONLINE (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.wilcoxinvest.com/market/WSfraudDec202.htm.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Shawn Young, Leading News: MCI Slashes $3 Billion From '05 Revenue Estimate,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 8, 2003).
169 See Wilcox, supra note 162.
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Wall Street history, WorldCom admitted that it had broken accounting rules to
enhance profit.' 7 ° While the WorldCom scandal was not the final saga in
accounting fraud for the year,17 ' it was, and still is, the largest, weighing in at
some ten billion dollars in financial misstatements.
172
Congress officially waded into the fray of corporate scandal on July 31,
2002, with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 17 3 Section 308 of the Act,
known as the "Fair Funds For Investors" provision changes how the SEC may
distribute civil penalties.174 Section 308(a) provides in part that:
If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission under the securities laws... the Commission obtains an order requiring
disgorgement against any person for a violation of such laws or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder, or such person agrees in settlement of any such action to such dis-
gorgement, and the Commission also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty
against such person, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the
direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund
for the benefit of the victims of such violation.
175
Under § 308, if the SEC obtains a disgorgement order that returns funds to
victims of securities violations, the amount of any additional civil penalty the
SEC also obtains may be added to the fund.
17 6
Of course, the rights under § 308 belong to the SEC and do not accrue to
the bankruptcy estate. 177 That fact would make it appear that the provision
would have only passing relevance to bankruptcy practice. However, the oper-
ation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's use of the Fair Funds Pro-
vision may have some implications with regard to the best interests test of
§ 1129(a)(7).
In May 2003, WorldCom and the SEC agreed to a $1.5 billion penalty.' 7 8
Subsequently, the amount WorldCom would pay was reduced to $500 million
to reflect the two-thirds discount that creditors are receiving for their claims.
17 9
However, the district court overseeing the securities litigation expressed con-
cern that the amount wasn't sufficient and the parties then submitted a new
plan. 8 o The new plan raised the payout for shareholders who had lost money
due to the company's fraud.' 81 Under the final settlement plan, shareholders
and bondholders who qualify would receive $750 million in compensation.1
8 2
The SEC has invoked the new Fair Funds Provision and intends to distribute
the $750 million penalty to victims of WorldCom's securities fraud, most of
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Rebecca Blumenstein, WorldCom Fraud Was Widespread, WALL ST. J. ONLINE
(June 20, 2003).
113 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See SEC Litigation Release No. 18147 (May 19, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/ litiga-
tionlitreleases/lrl8l47.htm) (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Release].
179 See Young, supra note 168.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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who will be former WorldCom shareholders. 183 However, the net effect of the
SEC's actions is to use the creditor's money to reimburse these shareholders.
Since the SEC expressly acknowledges the settlement to be a civil pen-
alty, "'84 the best interests test possibly precludes the agreement. Under
§ 726(a)(4) a fine, penalty, or forfeiture is paid only after unsecured claims are
paid in full.' 85 While it is true that the prioritization scheme in § 726(a)(4) is
exclusive to Chapter 7 bankruptcies, 186 by operation of the WorldCom settle-
ment, $750 million that would have gone to satisfy unsecured claims instead
goes to reimburse defrauded shareholders, a result that may violate the best
interests test.
187
But as the WorldCom disclosure statements show, even with the SEC set-
tlement, the reorganization plan appears to satisfy the best interests test since
creditors will receive $500 million more through the Chapter 11 plan than they
would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 188 The best interests test appears to be satis-
fied because even with the payment of the extra $750 million in Chapter 11,
unsecured creditors still receive more in chapter 11 than in liquidation. Indeed,
both the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the bankruptcy
plan complied with § 1129(a)(7) in that it was in the best interests of
creditors.1
8 9
The WorldCom liquidation analysis does not include the value of the
SEC's $750 million fine.' 90 However, the $750 million difference might not
have affected the analysis to any great degree since the Bankruptcy Court found
that the best interests test was satisfied because "[t]he distributions ... under
the Plan .. .far exceed the distributions under a chapter 7 liquidation."' 9 '
Since WorldCom's value outside of liquidation far exceeds its projected $6.5
billion value in Chapter 7, it clearly appears to have been in the best interests of
creditors to avoid liquidation. 92
However, the issue becomes much more salient in bankruptcies where the
corporation's reorganized value does not exceed the hypothetical liquidation
value by an amount greater than a fine levied by the SEC against the corpora-
tion under the Fair Funds for Investors provision. In a hypothetical bankruptcy
such as this, the critical question is whether the best interests test of
§ 1129(a)(7) incorporates the priority scheme of § 726(a)(4). The legislative
history supports such a result'9 3 and leading commentators reach the same con-
clusion,' 9 4 while in the courts a split of authority has evolved.' 95
183 Id.
18' See SEC Release, supra note 178.
185 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4).
186 Id.
187 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
188 WorldCom Disclosure Statement, supra note 159, at F-3.
189 See Young, supra note 168.
19o WorldCom Disclosure Statement, supra note 159, at F-3.
191 In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1401, at 165 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003).
192 Id.
193 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 412-13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368.
19' See COLLIER, supra note 142, at I 1129.03[7][c][ii].
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The split focuses on whether language in Chapter 7 precludes application
outside of that chapter or whether reading Chapter 7 in isolation is inconsistent
with § 1129(a)(7). Those who favor the latter interpretation can be called
incorporation proponents because they believe § 1129(a)(7) requires that Chap-
ter 7 be read in conjunction with the priority scheme of § 726(a)(4). Incorpora-
tion proponents argue that if penalties in Chapter 11 cases are treated on parity
with unsecured claims "the amount of unsecured liabilities would increase, and
the proportional dividend to chapter 11 unsecured creditors would not be
equivalent to their distribution in Chapter 7."196
To illustrate, corporation X manufactures widgets. The company has
reported stellar earning for several years and the stock price has responded
positively. However, X's rosy earnings reports have been fraudulently inflated
and that fact is eventually revealed to (understandably upset) public investors.
As a result, X's stock price plummets, its bond rating is reduced and the com-
pany is forced to file for Chapter 11 protection. In response to the public out-
cry over the fraud, the SEC levies a civil penalty under the Fair Funds
Provision. '97
To comply with the best interests test, X presents the estimated proceeds
from a Chapter 7 liquidation in the disclosure statement. The company's gross
liquidation proceeds are estimated at $100 million and after all of the adminis-
trative expense claims there is a net of $90 million available for distribution.
The creditors hold $10 million in secured claims that will be satisfied in full.
There are also over $200 million in unsecured general claims that will receive
the remaining $80 million or a recovery of about 40%. Company X is valued at
$150 million as a going-concern. Under the proposed Chapter 11 plan, X's
unsecured creditors will receive about $140 million or a recovery of about
70%.
Under this scenario, the best interests test is easily satisfied.1 98 The plan
leaves the unsecured creditors with $140 million which is significantly greater
than their $80 million hypothetical recovery in Chapter 7 liquidation. Roughly
stated, this is the situation in the WorldCom bankruptcy - the unsecured credi-
tors' recovery under Chapter 11 significantly exceeds their hypothetical recov-
ery of 0.00% in liquidation. 99
But what of the $80 million fine levied by the SEC? The prioritization
scheme indicates that the fine should be subordinated to the unsecured credi-
195 Compare Compton Corp. v. United States, 40 B.R. 875 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 90 B.R. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (section 1129(a)(7) does incorporate sec-
tion 726(a)(4)), and Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 36 B.R. 672
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (same), with Virtual Networks Servs. Corp. v. United States, 98 B.R.
343 (N.D. I11. 1989) (section 1129(a)(7) does not incorporate section 726(a)(4)), and In re
Colin, 44 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (nothing in the Code or the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended section 726(a)(4) to be read into the best interests test of
section 1129(a)(7)).
196 Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n (In re Erlin Manor Nursing
Home, Inc.), 36 B.R. 672, 678 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
197 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85.
198 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2002).
'9 WorldCom Disclosure Statement, supra note 159, at F-3.
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tors' claims if the company were in Chapter 7. 200 But the effect of paying the
$80 million penalty in Chapter 11 when X's company creditors have not been
paid in full is to treat a penalty on parity with unsecured claims. As a result of
paying the fine in Chapter 11, X's unsecured liabilities increase and the propor-
tional dividend to the Chapter 11 unsecured creditors is not greater than the
Chapter 7 creditors. In the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, the unsecured
creditors would have received $80 million, but after the operation of the Fair
Funds provision in Chapter 11 that recovery would drop to $70 million. With
regard to X's Chapter 11 reorganization, the best interests test of 1 129(a)(7)
would not be satisfied.
While incorporation of the 726(a) prioritization scheme into chapter 1
cases through the best interests test of 1129(a)(7) is appealing in that it would
place creditors above shareholders, the code itself may preclude such a reading.
Title 11 U.S.C § 103(b) explicitly states that subchapters I and II of Chapter 7
(and section 726(a) is part of subchapter H) "apply only in a case under [chap-
ter 7]. ' '2°1 Several jurisdictions have embraced this textualist interpretation and
held that § 103(b) precludes reading the priority scheme of 726(a) into the best
interests test.20 2 These courts have also argued that reading the statutory provi-
sions together would "add an additional layer of constraints to negotiation of
plans that Chapter 11 is designed to foster, a flexibility that is largely limited
only by protection of minority creditors and dissenting classes. 20 3
Of course, the stated rationale for the best interests test has always been
the protection of those creditors who dissent from a proposed plan. If creditor
protection is the real motivation for the statutory provision, then maybe the best
approach to affording that protection is to reduce the role of the debtor, which
has little motivation to look out for the creditor's interest. In this regard, the
United Kingdom may provide some guidance. England and the United States
have both evolved from the same common law bankruptcy roots, but each has
taken a very distinct approach to corporate reorganizations.20 4
C. Insights from the United Kingdom
The American concept of the best interests test establishes a statutory stan-
dard by which plans can be confirmed in spite of dissenting creditors, but not
unduly at their expense. Under the best interests test, unsecured creditors must
receive at least as much under a proposed Chapter 11 plan as they would under
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. 20 5 Because of the standard in 1 129(a)(7),
the safeguard afforded to the dissenting unsecured creditor under the American
system is entirely contingent upon the reliability of the liquidation analysis.
200 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (2002).
20 11 U.S.C. §103(b) (2002).
202 See, e.g., Virtual Networks Servs. Corp. v. United States, 98 B.R. 343 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(section 1129(a)(7) does not incorporate section 726(a)(4)); In re Colin, 44 B.R. 806 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984).
203 In re Colin, 44 B.R. at 809-810.
204 Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11
Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367 (2003).
205 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2002).
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The liquidation analysis is subjective 2 ° 6 at best and the values assigned to
a corporation's assets inspire even less confidence when, as in the American
system, the plan has been prepared and proposed by the debtor. British reor-
ganization procedure more carefully secures the "best interests" of unsecured
creditors in that (1) management does not continue in control of the company,
and (2) liquidation presumes it is not a "fire-sale" liquidation, but a sale of the
company as a going-concern. 2 °7
The United Kingdom has developed a system that is far more skeptical of
the American model that usually leaves the debtor in possession of the reorga-
nizing corporation.208 The American bankruptcy tradition evolved the concept
of a "debtor-in-possession," which simply means that the corporate manage-
ment that is in place when reorganization proceedings are initiated presumably
controls the bankruptcy process. 209 While this presumption is accurate in the
case of smaller corporations, in the case of larger, publicly traded companies,
while management may initiate the process, it is often replaced during the
chapter 11 reorganization. 210
The operation of the debtor in possession model in smaller Chapter 11
cases is of particular interest since they comprise the majority of Chapter 11
cases, 21 1 and the best interests test as it was originally intended under Chapter
XI was to facilitate smaller corporate reorganizations.21 2 In smaller Chapter 11
cases, management usually remains in place. 213 Often this is the case because
in small firms there is no difference between the management and the
stockholders.2 14
If the best interests test is to safeguard individual creditor interests, then
the liquidation analysis itself must genuinely reflect the company's true liquida-
tion value. To ensure the liquidation analysis truly reflects what the company
would be worth in liquidation the better rule would be to remove the debtor
from oversight of the analysis preparation. There is no evidence that the liqui-
dation analysis in the WorldCom bankruptcy is inaccurate. However, the pros-
pect of ethically-challenged corporate executives, who in large part are
personally responsible for their company's demise, overseeing the preparation
of a liquidation analysis does not engender trust in the process. If WorldCom
executives cannot be trusted to oversee honest accounting at their own firms, it
follows that there is little reason to trust them in bankruptcy proceedings.
In light of the prevalent corporate fraud revealed in 2002,215 the British
bankruptcy rules appear better suited to protecting creditor interests. The
appointment of an impartial administrator to oversee the preparation of a reor-
206 EPSTEIN, supra note 118, at §§ 10-18.
207 Martin, supra note 204, at 396-97.
208 Id. at 390.
209 Id. at 390-91.
210 Id.
211 See, e.g., Brian A Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small Businesses in
Bankruptcy, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGINc Bus. L. 181, 185 (2000) ("[S]mall businesses consti-
tute the overwhelming majority of business bankruptcies.
212 LaSalle Brief, supra note 17, at 13.
213 Martin, supra note 204, at 391.
214 Id.
215 See WILcox, supra note 162.
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ganization plan seems to be a better procedure to devise a plan in the creditors'
best interests than to entrust that duty to executives who are often concerned for
no one's best interest but their own. The present system, to the extent that it
restructures a corporation, but leaves corrupt management in control, suffers
from many of the same ills that plagued the equity receiverships of 100 years
ago.
Of course, unreliable liquidation analyses are not always the result of a
debtor-in-possession reorganization regime. The analysis itself may not be
based upon the right assumptions. The American understanding of the term
"liquidation" in bankruptcy is very different from the meaning British bank-
ruptcy practitioners attach to the term.2 16 While under the American system
liquidation often assumes a sort of "fire-sale" immediate selling of the assets,
the British approach is to view the company as a going-concern or as several
component going-concerns that could be sold to pay creditors.21 7
The reorganization process most prevalent in the United Kingdom is the
"Administration."218 Under the administration procedure, an administrator is
appointed who then assumes control over the company.21 9 Shortly thereafter,
the administrator proposes a reorganization plan that then goes before a vote of
the creditors.220 If both a quantitative and qualitative majority of creditors
approve of the administrator's proposed plan, they can vote for it.22 1 If those
creditors do not approve the plan, then a traditional liquidation occurs.222
The administrator system does result in some reorganizations.2 23 The
reorganization that is actually envisioned, however, is in actuality very different
from the American concept of reorganization under Chapter 11. As English
attorney John White has explained, "[i]f the proposal is approved by the credi-
tors, then the administrator moves forward, realizes assets, and sells."224 In
this regard the usual use of the Administration is to "sell companies as going
concerns rather than in piece-meal form." 2: 5 This is the opposite of the typical
American chapter 11 reorganization which usually has very little to do with
realizing assets and "selling. 226 In short, the approach in the United Kingdom
216 See Martin, supra note 204, at 396-97.
217 Id.
218 See Richard F. Broude, et al., The Judge's Role in Insolvency Proceedings: The View
from the Bench; The View from the Bar, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 516 (2002)
(stating that administration is the United Kingdom's "most popular and most effective reha-
bilitative procedure").
219 Martin, supra note 204, at 393-94.
220 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45 § 5(2) (Eng.) (establishing the voting procedure for
approval of an administrator proposed plan). See also Martin, supra note 204, at 394.
221 See Martin, supra note 204, at 394.
222 See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45 § 5(2) (Eng.)
223 See Evan D. Flaschen, Sorting Out Mr. Maxwell's Tangled Webs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5,
1992, at 19 ("[British administration] proceedings are the English version of reorganization
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy code.").
224 See Broude, supra note 219, at 517.
225 See Martin, supra note 204, at 396-97.
226 See Judy Beckner Sloan, Current Problems in International Insolvency, 2 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 175, 177 (1995) (book review) ("[M]ost administrations in the United Kingdom
result in the sale of the business, while in the United States, the business tends to remain in
the hands of the debtor.").
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is to displace management and liquidate the company not in piece-meal form,
but while still operational.22 7
Liquidation along British lines, which calculates the company's value as
an operational entity rather than as a fire-sale of its parts, may better serve the
best interests test. If the baseline for determining whether the claims of dissent-
ing individual creditors under Chapter 11 is what they receive in liquidation,
then that liquidation should be consistent with the real value of the company.
The real value of many companies lies not in their component assets, but in
their value as a going concern.
The estimated liquidation proceeds WorldCom set forth in its disclosure
statement placed the value of the company's assets at roughly $16 billion, of
which $6.5 billion was considered recoverable after a fire-sale sort of liquida-
tion. 228 The company would be sold in small non-operational pieces that
would recover only 16.4% on assets such as the company's property, plants and
equipment. 229 Under that analysis almost $40 billion in general unsecured
claims recover nothing.23 °
Under a British liquidation proposal, however, the company would not be
sold under an asset sale.231 The liquidation would either take place by selling
the company as a going-concern to a willing buyer or by selling off pieces of
the company as smaller going concerns.23 2 Of course, a buyer of a bankrupt
WorldCom is not going to purchase the company for sufficient value to repay
in full all of the roughly $50 billion in claims.2 33 But selling off the component
parts as going-concerns, which is consistent with the British concept of liquida-
tion, would raise much more than the wholly insufficient $6.5 billion projected
in the liquidation analysis.
WorldCom's three core assets could be sold off to willing buyers. 234 MCI
Group, WorldCom's consumer-long-distance company had projected revenue
of $8.3 billion for 2002.235 UUNET, WorldCom's worldwide data network,
accounts for over 30% of U.S. internet traffic and had sales of $4.7 billion. in
2002.236 The sale of these two assets alone would likely raise much more than
the $6.5 billion projected proceeds in a fire-sale liquidation. In addition,
WorldCom's core corporate long distance services would likely fetch billions
in addition to MCI and UUNET.237
Maybe the best way to ensure the protection of dissenting creditors is not
to trust a liquidation analysis that presumes a fire-sale liquidation. Rather,
227 Martin, supra note 204, at 396.
228 WorldCom Disclosure Statement, supra note 159, at F-3.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Martin, supra note 204, at 396-97.
232 Id.
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creditor claims might be more realistically preserved by valuing a company
under the British approach that would sell a company's component parts as
valid, running business concerns. That would appear to be truly in the best
interests of creditors and would reflect more accurately the real value of the
bankrupt company.
IV. CONCLUSION
The best interests of creditors is a statutory standard under which Chapter
11 bankruptcy plans can win approval despite dissenting individual creditors.
A Chapter 11 reorganization plan that complies with the test proposes to pay
creditors at least what they would have received if the company were liquidated
under Chapter 7. The test itself is a contemporary fusion of the concept of
composition agreements as it appeared in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the
practices derived from the 19th century equity receivership. These two
approaches to reorganizations were eventually combined in 1978 to comprise
the modem best interests test presently found in the Bankruptcy Code.
The effectiveness of the best interests test depends entirely upon the accu-
racy of the hypothetical liquidation analysis. The WorldCom bankruptcy is an
example of a modem reorganization that complies with the current interpreta-
tion of the best interests test. Yet, that bankruptcy implicates scenarios where
the SEC's application of the Fair Funds provision would pay shareholders
under a Chapter 11 plan while creditors received less than they would in a
Chapter 7. In that scenario, the Fair Funds provision seriously undermines the
best interests test.
However, to the extent that the test is to safeguard creditor recovery while
facilitating plan proposal and acceptance, the United Kingdom, which places an
impartial Administrator in control of preparing and proposing a plan, might
better safeguard the reliability of the liquidation analysis itself. The better
approach might be to move away from the American debtor-in-possession
bankruptcy model, at least to the extent that the debtor prepares and presents
the liquidation analysis. Furthermore, British liquidations, which value the
company, not through a hypothetical "fire-sale," but through a projected sale of
the company as a going-concern are more likely to provide a better return to
creditors. If the test is to truly safeguard individual creditor recovery, the Brit-
ish approach appears to more consistently reach that end.
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